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SUMMARY 
The paper proposes to examine two variables in connection with the Kurdish presence in Tur-
key: 1) the intensity of expression of Kurdish nationalism, and 2) repercussions of the Kurdish ques-
tion on Turkey. Three components pertaining to the Kurdish case in Turkey were constmcted from 
the literature: distinct cultural identity, political demands and socio-economic development. The pa-
per concludes that despite radical shifts on both sides, it is still questionable whether a solution to the 
enduring conflict could be reached in the near future. 
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1. Introduction 
Estimated at a population of 25 million, the Kurds are the largest nation in 
the world without its own state. They are an ancient and etlmically distinct people 
who have developed a common identity over the past 2,000 years. Bulloch and 
Morris (1992) consider that the ethnic composition ofthe Kurds is the result of mi-
xing with both Indo-European and pre-Iranian tribes. The Muslim conquest ofKur-
distan in the 7111 century introduced Islam among the Kurds and emphasized their 
political role. They have lived for thousands of years in an area, referred to on maps 
for centuries as Kurdistan, and which straddles the borders of Turkey, ' 'Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and the former Soviet Union. Though none of the above-mentioned states has 
welcomed the prospect of an independent state for the Kurds, none has tried harder 
than Turkey to eliminate Kurdish identity. The history of the sizable Kurdish com-
munity in Turkey, where they comprise over 20 percent of the Turkish population 
(Dunn, 1995: 74), is an ancient chronicle oftragedies, massacres and atrocities. 
The founder of modem Turkey, Kemal Atatiirk, after exploiting the Kurds 
for years to fight and defend the Republic against external enemies, enacted a con-
stitution 70 years ago, which denied the existence of distinct cultural sub-groups in 
Turkey. All religious or ethnic identities other than the Turkish were seen as a chal-
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lenge to the state. As a result, the Kurds were referred to as "Mountain Turks" and 
the area known Kurdistan became known as southern Anatolia. The Treaty of Sevres 
(1920), which had anticipated a Kurdish independent state, was never ratified. Un-
til the Gulf War in 1991, the situation of the Kurds remained unchanged. Twelve 
million Kurds live in Turkey today, but Kurdish cultural and political expression is 
officially banned. As an unwanted minority, the Kurds have been ignored, discri-
minated against, deported and persecuted by Turkish authorities. The history of the 
Kurds in Turkey is a history of war, repression, a history of small victories and 
great losses. The world paid little attention to the Kurdish catastrophe in Turkey, to 
the hopelessness and to the spectacular struggle of a people for basic rights and 
autonomy. 
This paper intends to investigate two primary variables, which are believed 
to influence the situation of the Kurds in Turkey. These concern: 1) the intensity of 
expression of Kurdish nationalism, 2) repercussions of the Kurdish question on 
Turkey. I intend to trace the evolution ofKurdish nationalism and to examine whe-
ther it was capable of making cultural, political and socio-economic demands. Cor-
respondingly, has the strong Turkish nationalism prevented Kurds from attaining 
their demands? Furthurmore, have recent political developments in Turkey impro-
ved the status of the Kurds in Turkey? True, international pressure to promote 
Kurdish rights and Turkey's desire to join the European Community have played a 
part in softening Turkish repression of the Kurds. Yet, as this paper concludes, the 
likelihood of a solution to the crisis is still remote, as the demands of both sides 
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2. The emergence of Kurdish nationalism 
The first expression of Kurdish nationalism occurred during the 19th century 
when the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a process of centralization. Until then, 
the Kurdish Emirates had enjoyed virtual autonomy. The Kurds fell under Ottoman 
rule as early as the 16th century, but due to a special arrangement they were orga-
nized into Emirates (principalities) enjoying a remarkable degree of autonomy, al-
though subordinated to Istanbul (Yegen, 1996: 217). Attempts by the Ottomans to 
tighten their grip on the Kurdish Emirates provoked intennittent Kurdish uprisings 
(1808- 1839), all of which were unsuccessful: they lacked the support of the majority 
of the population (i.e. unlike European nationalism) and especially the participation 
of a strong administrative and political bourgeois class. In addition, Kurdish leaders 
were drawn into internal power struggles instead of being committed to the esta-
blishment of an independent Kurdish state. 
By the end of the 19th century, the primary result of Ottoman modernization 
was the erosion of decentralised aspects of Ottoman politics and hence the abolish-
ment of the Emirates, which had constituted a communal and organizational bond uni-
ting Kurdish tribes. This development resulted in tribal confrontations that the cen-
tral authorities failed to regulate (Yegen, 1996: 219). The situation provided for the 
appearance of new actors in Kurdish politics: the sheikhs. These tribal leaders 
played a central role in Kurdish rebellions, namely sheikh Ubeidullab's revolt in the 
1870's, which aimed at establishing an independent Kurdish entity, is referred to as 
the first national uprising of the Kurds (Hazen, 1997: 56). The rebellion was ultimate-
ly crushed with the aid of regional and international powers (Randal, 1997: 156). 
In the second half of the 19th century the Kurds, just as other nationalities in 
the Ottoman Empire, were affected by nationalist sentiment. Kurdish intellectuals 
began to form secret societies aiming either at some form of decentralized admini-
stration of the Kurdish provinces, or full independence from the Ottoman Empire 
(Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 55). However, in a basically tribal and rural 
society such activities were bound to fail without the backing of powerful tribes 
and strong leaders who could organize sufficient manpower in order to generate 
political change. The Young Turks' revolt in 1908 had first pledged to preserve 
equal rights for all ethnic groups residing within the Empire, but ended by banning 
all non-Turkish forms of cultural and political expression (Jamil, 1993):· 
The Ottoman Empire's engagement in World War I had adverse repef~us­
sions on the Kurds. Officially the war was waged against external enemies, but in 
practical tenns it was also directed against local enemies; i.e.' the non-Turkish spea-
king peoples in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans exploited the Kurds' religious 
feeling by describing the war as a holy war. They encouraged them to contribute 
and defend the empire against non-believers, hence provoking some Kurdish tribes 
to participate in the massacre of more than one million Armenians in the period 
1915- 1916. Kurdish losses were also not negligible - 7000 were killed in that war 
(Michalowski, 1991 ). 
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After WWI, the Kurds were presented with an opportunity to form their own 
nation-state. Yet their efforts were fruitless. Neither the Treaty of Sevres (1920) 
nor the Lausanne Conference (1923) succeeded in securing an independent Kurdish 
state. After the establishment of the New Republic in 1923, the Kurds were conti-
nuously subjected to oppression by Atatlirk and his successors. 
3. The Kurds in Turkey: a problematic existence 
The history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is really the history of the war 
between two nationalisms: Kurdish and Kemalist. Ever since the founding of modem 
Turkey in 1923, Kurds in Turkish Kurdistan were systematically repressed, perse-
cuted and fought against. The aggressive Turkish nationalism launched by Atatlirk, 
the "father of the Turks", and maintained by successive rulers, was until today the 
basis of Ankara's policy towards the Kurds. Atati.irk adopted a policy of assimilation 
or turkification, with the principal aim to abolish the Kurdish language and replace it 
by the Turkish. This objective is still today imaged as a "cultural mission", since 
Turkey considers Kurdish nationalism a challenge to the Kemalist vision. 
3.1 The Atati.irk regime 
With the birth of the modem Republic of Turkey, the Caliphate was abolished; 
religious orders were abolished, history was written to suit the needs of the new state, 
the "Arabic alphabet" was discarded in favour of a Western one and a new dress code 
was adopted. After jettisoning the multi-ethnic character of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Turkish government embarked on a radical nationalist programme that intended to 
redefine the Turk, the new citizen of the nation, and to help in the turkicization of 
non-Turkish minorities. The new nationalist ideology was unlike i.he Ottoman Em-
pire's, that had relied upon a more encompassing Islamic theme. According to Caglar 
Keyder (1997: 42), it was "defensive in nature where the nation was supposed to 
express homogeneity deriving from ethnic unity, and this unity would be expressed 
in a single voice". 
The Turkish Republic of Atatiirk was not only a secular state, it also. claimed 
to establish a civic nationhood based on all the inhabitants of the country. This ci-
vic concept of nationhood was never truly implemented and acceptance in the new 
state could only be achieved by assimilation which meant transforming the Kurds 
not only legally and politically into Turks, but also forcing them to become cultu-
rally and socially integrated. 
3 .1.1 Cultural status 
Atati.irk forcefully suppressed Kurdish cultural demands out of fear that they 
would contradict the homogenous qualities of the nation. By 1924, all public vesti-
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ges of a separate Kurdish cultural identity, such as schools, associations, publica-
tions and religious teaching foundations, were banned in Turkey (Dunn, 1995: 78). 
Any public expression of Kurdish culture became punishable under sedition laws 
that could carry a death sentence, for it constituted a threat to national integration; 
it served to emphasize a people's distinct way of thinking. Ironically, communica-
tion in Kurdish was banned at a time when only three or four percent of the Kurds 
were able to speak Turkish. The Kurds had to accept the historical thesis that both 
Turks and Kurds descended from the same race (Kaplan, 1987: 40) and that Kurds 
had forgotten their mother tongue due to isolation in the mountains of Anatolia. In 
an attempt to justify the state's discrimination of the Kurdish language, communi-
cation was restricted to Latin script. In schools, teachers and students were allowed 
only to communicate in Turkish. Classes and education in Kurdish were forbidden; 
more than 90 percent of the names of Kurdish villages were converted to Turkish, 
and Kurdish dress and folklore were banned (Entessar, 1992). 
3 .1.2 Political status 
The Kemalist model of a secular republic and a unitary nation and state meant 
continuous denial of Kurdish rights. Kurdish national awareness was perceived as a 
mortal threat to the territorial integrity and unity of the state (Gunter, 1988: 403). The 
government of Turkey was committed to eradicating anything that suggested a sepa-
rate Kurdish identity in the country: "Those who are not of pure Turkish origin do 
not have any rights but one in this country, that of being slaves" (Jamil, 1993: 12). 
The Kurds could not read the meaning of the Turkish resolve to eliminate se-
cessionist movements. In pursuit of a doomed opportunity, many Kurdish nationalist 
uprisings against the Turkish authorities occurred between 1925 and 1937, but were 
all brutally crushed. The revolts resulted from social discontent: "Our Kurdish schools 
are closed, the use of the Kurdish language is banned, the words 'Kurds' and 'Kurdi-
stan' are not allowed and barbarian methods are practiced against us" (J arnil, 1993: 8). 
Summed up, the Turkish state sought only to repress Kurdish political de-
mands: "Only the Turkish people have the right to demand ethnic and racial privi-
leges ... this land is for the Turks" (Aziz, 1992: 181 ). 
3.1.3 Socio-economic status 
In order to alleviate pressure and prevent rebellions, Ankara decided to de-
nude the area of Kurdistan of its Kurdish population and to relocate it especially to 
West em patts of Turkey: "Cigogners, non-Turkish and nomads who hold Turkish 
citizenship will be settled in small groups in regions where the Turkish culture is 
strongly manifest. Whenever they threaten the security of Turkey they will be ejec-
ted out of Turkey" (Aziz, 1992: 188). Consequently, the govemment evacuated the 
less accessible parts of "Kurdistan" for material, cultural, political, strategic and 
public order reasons (Hazen, 1979: 52). Kurdish histdry, language and culture ~ere 
ignored, and Kurdish identity was destroyed through deportation and dispersion. 
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3.2 Kurdish nationalism vs. Turkish nationalism (1938-1984) 
Atatiirk' s repressive measures destroyed Kurdish tribal and clan ties and po-
wer structures. Thus, Kurdish nationalists were silenced for the next 30 years or at 
least left on the defensive. On the other hand, Kurdish political movements became 
associated with the political left because Turkish authorities cooperated with feudal 
lords and tribal leaders to suppress nationalist activities (Fuller, 1993: 111 ). During 
the 1940's there were many indicators that Kurds in Turkey seemed to accept as si-
milation. This period was characterized by the absence of Kurdish handwork, cul-
ture, commerce, the absence of all aspects of civilization in Kurdish areas, the ab-
sence of Kurdish schools and health care (McDowall, 1992: 38). Slight develop-
ments occurred in the 1950's, since the Kurds benefited politically from the institu-
tion of a multi-party democracy. They worked closely with Adnan Menderes who 
replaced the Kemalist leadership. Kurds became members of parliament and even 
ministers under the rule of the Democratic Party. The area of Kurdistan benefited 
economically as schools, hospitals and roads were constructed in Kurdistan. How-
ever, the Kurdish language was tolerated only in private conversation because there 
were limits to the Democratic Party's liberalization policy (Gunter, 1990b: 59). 
In the 1960's, a progressive tendency- a neo-Kemalist ideology- appeared 
in Turkey. The situation of the Kurdish minority further improved under the new 
constitution, which granted the Kurds more civil liberties but prohibited the fonna-
tion of any ethnic association "that impairs Turkey's unity". Only Kurds who claimed 
Turkish identity were permitted to participate in political life through Turkish orga-
nizations, since Kurdish parties were not legalized. Kurdish politicians benefited 
from Turkey's multi-party system by bargaining their support for the party that 
promised to consider their problems in East Anatolia (Aziz, 1992: 188). 
As soon as the military took power in 1971, severe anti-Kurdish measures, 
tolerated by the West (Olson, 1992: 15), contributed to the revival of Kurdish na-
tionalism. In fact the period witnessed the formation of more than 15 Kurdish radi-
cal parties and movements in the 1970's advocating Kurdish political, cultural and 
social demands - either through peaceful means or through armed force. The most 
important of these groups was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a clandestine 
Marxist-Leninist organization that was to recruit socio-economically marginalized 
people and to seek an independent socialist Kurdish state through anned struggle 
(McDowall, 1992: 44). The PKK is very much a reflection of the government's de-
nial of the Kurdish identity and its refusal to accommodate Kurdish national aspira-
tions for cultural and political autonomy. This movement played a crucial role. in 
pushing the Kurdish problem to the forefront of Turkish and international politics 
(Kutshera, 1994). 
The military intervened again in 1980 in order to back the regime that had 
been subjected to severe attacks by Leftists, Islamists and Kurds at the same time. 
The 1982 constitution, enacted during a period of military rule, was a cultural 
crackdown on the Kurds of proportions unseen since the founding of the Republic 
by Atati.irk in 1 923. A series of new laws banned efforts to divide the nation and 
i 
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baned Kurds from expressing opinions and thoughts in their native language, be-
cause the dissemination of ideas in Km·dish was considered an attack on the unitmy 
state and its tenitorial integrity. 
The constitution also prohibited and sanctioned against publications, printed 
matter, records, videocassettes or any other production in Kurdish . Accordingly, no 
Km-dish-speaking schools or learning institutions were allowed to be established. 
Materials on Kurdish history, culture and ethnic identity were banned. Listening to 
Km·dish programs and foreign broadcasts was also forbidden (Gunter, 1990b: 44). 
Kurdish songs and costume were officially banned even in private occasions 
and Kurdish names prohibited because they contradicted Turkish national culture. 
Therefore, names were forcibly changed and parents who resisted were threatened 
and interrogated. 
No one dared to discuss the Kurdish question, especially in universities, poli-
tical parties or the mass media. The political status of the Kurds was lower than that 
of a colony. The Kurds were granted rights as long as they admitted to being Turks; 
the alternative was repression and persecution. Unlike Kurds in neighboring coun-
tries - where they are recognized officially as a distinct community - in Turkey 
there was no room for the expression of Kurdish identity: "the Kurds are true 
Turks" (McDowall, 1992: 44). 
3.3 The 1990's: the Kurdish quest for political, cultural and socio-
economic demands 
The Kurdish quest, in the 1990's, for recognition as a distinct ethnic group 
with special rights can be examined from two important dimensions. The first has 
to do with the material situation of the Turkish Kurds and their standard of living. 
The second derives from the Kurds' ideological aspiration for cultural and political 
rights, for freedom, and for a distinct ethnic identity. 
3.3 .1 Kurdish socio-economic demands 
The Turkish government has deliberately withheld developmental funds and 
resources from the Kurdish regions in South East Anatolia. Turkish Kurdistan is an 
impoverished and remote area, which receives only 10 percent of state industrial 
investment and 2 percent of c01mnercial investment. The GNP per capita is 500 
$US, while the national average for Turkey is 2,000 $US (Kirici, 1996: 28). Elec-
tricity, pipe water and roads are practically inexistent in 50 percent of the villages. 
Kurdish nationalist feeling was enhanced by a variety of factors: unemployment, 
distress and the absence of prospects for the future and a sense of grievance against 
the richer parts of Turkey in addition to political discrimination against the Kurds. 
For instance, ordinary Kurds living in this area could watch on TV only the moder-
nization and teclmological developments in Western Turkey (Randal, 1997). Al-
though considerable improvements have taken place in recent years, the gap bet-
ween Turkish Kurdistan and Western Anatolia has widened. Historically, the pre-
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sence of natural resources was one of the major causes that led to the annexation of 
Turkish Kurdistan, especially richness in minerals, a prosperous agriculture and the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Despite this profusion of resources, the Turkish govern-
ment did not develop any industry in the area but only extracted from Turkish Kur-
distan the natural resources necessary for the development of other parts of the 
country. Moreover, an important dimension of the Kurdish problem was related to 
the government's misdistribution of income and wealth. The South-East Anatolian 
Project (GAP), which had been proposed to economically develop a large part of 
Turkish Kurdistan by building 22 dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, had tur-
ned out to have been for the benefit of non-Kurds (Kinnane-Roelofsma, 1998). The 
project was supposed to supply Ankara and Western Turkey with much of its ener-
gy through 19 hydroelectric power stations. With the exception of the Southeast, 
Kurdistan, which lacks any industry and the hydroelectric power, consumes less 
than 5 percent of the electricity of the state (The Economist, 1996, no. 7965). In the 
meantime, expensive irrigation projects trumpeted as the main benefit to the local 
Kurds, remained illusive. The single largest territory, which will be irrigated by the 
GAP, is outside Kurdistan in the Arab-inhabited plains of Harran on the Syrian-
Turkish border. The project will end by destroying the ancient culture of 10 to 12 
million indigenous Kurds that will be drowned by the dam, assimilating Kurdish 
identity to the utter indifference of the Kurds themselves. In a study of the Kurds' 
opinions on the GAP project, Car! Nestor found among twelve prominent Kurdish 
figures and organizations all over the world, only mild concern that the GAP would 
destroy historical sites and obliterate the Kurdish presenc·e (Nestor; 1996). 
Another area of concern to the Kurds is education, since standards in the South-
east (McDowall, 1992: 55) lag far behind the national standard, meaning that as long 
as the Kurdish community remains uneducated it will be unable to benefit fiom the 
GAP. In other words, economic regeneration of the Southeast remains contingent to 
political liberalization and encouragement of the Kurdish people to express them-
selves freely in their own language (Gunter, 1990b). Liberalization in the Turkish si-
tuation has not modified official treatment of social and economic conditions. 
Since 1985 the Southeast has lost 66.9 percent of its population due to inter-
nal migration from the countryside to the cities (National Catholic Reporter, 1996). 
Some people have moved voluntarily in search of work, others have moved as a re-
sult of harassment, eviction or destruction of their houses by state security forces. 
Out of 12 million Kurds in Turkey, it is estimated that three million ·have mi-
grated from the Kurdish region to urban centers (more etlmically mixed) in order to 
escape devastation. The largest Kurdish population lives in Istanbul and other Tur-
kish cities (Dunn, 1995). Although the PKK recmits tl1e majority of its members 
from harassed villages in the Southeast, heavy repression fmihered the growth of 
national consciousness and urban-based Kurds have been central to the advancement 
of the movement's political ideology (Kramer, 1999: 34). They were able to notice 
the disparity of economic standards between western and eastern Turkey. Although 
many Kurds voluntarily accept integration in Turkish cities, a minority has become 
increasingly politicized due to uprootedness from their cultural environment. 
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On the other hand, Turkey's failure to develop its Kurdish regions prompted 
over a million Kurds to migrate to Western European countries during the period 
1950-80 and this flow still continues. Kurdish political activities outside Turkey have 
contributed to the stmggle for basic rights. Political freedoms in these democratic states 
and encouragement for political expression have inevitably provided a vital impetus to 
Kurdish political thinking. Kurdish political groups and organizations are active in 
most countries of the European Community. They have helped to develop political 
ideologies, which today inspire the various Kurdish parties in eastern Anatolia. 
3.3.2 Kurdish cultural and political demands 
Since the mid 1980's, internal changes in Turkey have helped bring about 
new realities concerning the situation of the Kurds. Kurdish existence, grievances 
and aspirations have become part of the process of democratization in the cotmtry. 
Therefore, it is probably safe to say that the conflict between Turks and Kurds has 
acquired a new dimension. This section examines both the political and cultural 
evolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, and the transformation in the Turkish 
political environment. Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the expression of a 
Kurdish identity, just as is the case with all ethnic identities, is a dynamic process 
that is subject to change over time due to various internal and external events. 
Today Kurdish perceptions and aspirations are different from those of the past, and 
they may be subject to further modification depending on new developments. 
3.3.2.1 Kw·dish independent or an autonomous state 
Repression and force remain the sole response to Kurdish political aspirations, 
which are not completely separatist, but endanger the national and territorial integrity 
of Turkey (Michalowski, 1991 ). In addition to politics, economic considerations play 
a part in Turkey's position: the Southeast is considered a strategic region, which 
provides the country with much of its needed petrol and electricity resources and as 
such it will be difficult to grant Kurds autonomy (The Economist, 1996, no. 7969). 
3.3.2.2 Kurdish language 
In 1991, in an act reflecting a change in state behavior towards the Kurds, 
known as the "language bill", the Turkish National Assembly lifted some of the re-
strictions on the Kurdish language. Kurdish language was allowed in pf:ivate con-
versations, and forms of Kurdish cultural expression were pennitted but officially 
remained illegal, although the government promised to soften the ban (Smith, 
1994). However, practicing it might lead to provocation by the police, as Turkish 
authorities fear that yielding language rights to Kurds would lead to demands for 
independence in the future. 
3.3.2.3 Kurdish distinct ethnic identity 
The Kurds living in Turkey make up close to ,50 pe.r:cent of the total wofld-
wide Kurdish population and close to one fifth of the whole Turkish population. 
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However, due to political considerations and also assimilation, only Kurds who do 
not speak Kurdish are officially counted for census purpose, so as to minimize the 
number (Randal, 1997). The government fears that any reference to citizens of 
Kurdish origin as a separate entity will lead to "discrimination": placing these peo-
ples who currently enjoy equal rights with the rest of those living in Turkey into a 
second-class position (Ismet, 1992). This may encourage Turks to distance them-
selves from Kurds and vice versa; eventually the process will lead to confrontation. 
Consequently, all forms of explicit Kurdishness are heavily repressed. 
In fact, Turkish statesmen have shown signs of political flexibility. President 
Ozal recognized in 1989 that Turkey, in the first years of the republic, committed a 
mistake regarding the existence of the Kurdish minority (Fuller, 1993) and pro-
posed to discuss Kurdish political demands explicitly. On the other hand, Kurds in 
Turkey can become MP's, ministers, and civil servants (McKiennan, 1999) after 
they agreed to accept the legitimacy of the political system. 
3.3.2.4 Kw·dish cultural demands 
In most essential respects, Kurdish cultural demands have been excluded from 
the process of liberalization. Ideas reflecting broad cultural autonomy are unthinkable 
because they are unconstitutional and against the Kemalist vision. The authorities 
still fear that granting the Kurdish minority cultural rights might lead in the future to 
political demands for independence and secession. President Demirel has even called 
for purging Kurdish Turks who occupy state positions and who have separatist fee-
ling, because they challenge the govemment from within (Ismet, 1992). 
3.3.2.5 Reference to Kurdish question in the p ress 
Turkey, compared to other countries hosting Kurds, is by far the most demo-
cratic, with the greatest degree of freedom of press and public debate on most issues, 
except the Kurdish issue (Fuller, 1993). The authorities fear that public discussion 
of the Kurdish question might lead to the disintegration of a country of 26 ethnic 
groups and might undermine Turkish solidarity and unity. Therefore, severe mea-
sures were undertaken to prosecute the media, under the allegation of separatist 
propaganda, which is not really well defined. Joumals and journalists were accused 
of pro-Kurdish stands and all texts with reference to "the Kurds" were either con-
fiscated or the journals banned, and the journalist imprisoned. Restrictions on the 
press became worse under Demirel and Ciller. In 1993, 14 journalists were impri-
soned for 2 to 5 years and 1 07 journal employees were sanctioned for alleged sup-
port to the PKK. In 1996, Turkey ranked at the top in the list of countries violating 
the freedom of the press (New York Times, 1996). 
3.3.3 The transformations inside Turkish society and political circles 
Since 1988 the Turkish state, having started a liberalization process, claimed 
to adhere to democratic practices, and promised to adopt more pragmatic options 
towards Kurdish demands. Starting with the shocking stat,ement ,ofTurgut Ozal du-
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ring a 1988 election campaign stop in Diyarbakir that "in Turkey there is no diffe-
rence between Turk and Kurd", the state has moved to relax the ban on Kurdish-
ness (Goltz, 1999). In the 1990's the question of Turkey's Kurds became a greater 
domestic issue, increasingly debated. The Turks became more critical regarding the 
rightness and efficacy of Turkish official policy towards the Kurds and have even 
shown greater sympathy for Kurdish political and cultural demands. Internal pres-
sure for a more peaceful approach towards a political solution to the Kurdish prob-
lem has grown significantly. In this regard, intellectuals and politicians called for 
official recognition of the Kurdish minority as a basic human right. For them, re-
cognizing Kurdish cultural autonomy does not contradict Turkish state unity. They 
think the Kurds would be satisfied with cultural recognition without a separate 
Kurdish state. Conversely, the refusal to acknowledge a separate Kurdish identity 
would turn politicized Kurds, from being an element of cultural enrichment for 
Turkey, to becoming a weapon of radicalization in the process of separation and 
division. Such intellectuals and politicians believe that the old formula of denial 
and oppression has been proving itself counter productive. 
3. 4 The transformation of Kurdish political and cultural demands 
The Kurds in Turkey, as a major etlmic group, have long been aware of their 
"Kurdishness" or distinctiveness. However, their etlmic and cultural aspirations 
have been systematically ignored, denied or suppressed within the country. The 
Kurds have been forced to evolve within Turkey's political culture, system and 
structure. As long as they claim to be of "Kurdish roots", their social rights will 
continue to be denied and tl1ey will not enjoy the same rights as Turks. In order to 
guarantee their compliance, Turkish authorities resort to a two folded policy: first, 
a policy of dispersing the Kurds geographically away from the capital and political 
centers, and second, a policy of assimilation where the Kurds' first contacts are 
forcibly with Turks, therefore compelling them to intermingle (Olson, 1992: 13). 
Despite all this brutal repression, the Kurdish sense of separate ethnic and 
cultural identities has remained strong. In addition to the Kurdish language, which 
is largely spoken in Kurdish villages, the Kurds clandestinely diffuse political wri-
tings and literature. These serve to promote, through cultural associations and li-
beration groups, their desire for autonomy and independence. Folklore songs and 
other traditions are maintained and expressed verbally because the Kurds are par-
tially denied access to writing. 
In Turkey, Kurdish cultural identity is strongly fought: Kurdishness means 
separatism, and being "Kurd" is equal to belonging to the PKK. After nearly seven 
decades of ideological rigidity, the Kurds considered "the language bill" an important 
positive step towards a solution to ilieir problems, but recognizing Kurdish presence 
in Turkey is not enough unless cultural rights are granted. The Kurds may be willing 
to cease demands for separation, but they will not abandon their cultural rights. Even 
the most radical Kurdish elements, such as the PKK, seem to have ceased demanding 
separation from Turkey, or as the leader Oujalan explains "separating the region 
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from Turkey immediately is out of question. Om people need Turkey and we can't 
separate for another 40 years" (Michalowski, 1991: 74). This position was main-
tained in a survey conducted among Kurdish professionals in 1995 (Randal, 1997). 
Oujalan held that his group might opt for a diplomatic moderate solution and 
offered negotiations and a possible cease fire, breaking with his demands for inde-
pendence in exchange for just free political and cultural expression for Turkey's 
Kurds (Gunter, 1990b: 39). Although for Oujalan an independent Kurdish state is 
ideal, he would consider going into a sort of federation with Turkey, a political, eco-
nomic and social union: "Kurds can gain independence without changing the borders 
in the region, because independence is a frame of mind . . . " (Michalowski, 1991: 75). 
4. Prospects 
During the 1990's, the situation of the Kurds in Turkey received more atten-
tion and international pressure ensued to find a solution to the problem. Recent 
developments suggest the situation is improving but a solution requires a radical 
change in mentality. There are serious indicators that the Kurdish problem has 
badly affected the Turks, but any solution requires time, and whether radical ele-
ments on both sides intend to give the government tllis time is questionable. The 
restructuring of the system that began in 1992 with a democratization drive in re-
gard to freedoms and human rights, has deepened its roots but has led also to in-
creased terrorism and increased frustration with the adminish·ation. As a result, the 
authorities have labeled all reforms as concessions. A hidden debate is underway 
between the adherents to the Kemalist vision and those willing to concede to the 
Kurds because of internal and external pressure. 
Internally, Turkish public opinion and members of the government have 
pressed for a more flexible official policy: the Turks should no longer see Kurdish 
cultural awareness as a mortal threat to the continuity and integrity of Turkey and 
should distinguish between political demands for autonomy and cultural demands. 
In this way members of the Kurdish community would learn to become Turkish 
citizens. In this regard, the statement of foreign nlinister Ismail Cem gains impor-
tance: "Kurds should have cultural rights" (The Economist, 1995, no. 7908). 
There has also been some improvement in the situation since Europeans have 
been talking with Turkey about Kurdish problems. Turkey's demand to join the Eu-
ropean Community depends on its willingness to respect human and minority rights 
internally. That is why the Turkish government is compelled to find an alternative to 
repression and to accept the Kurdish reality. The Kurdish problem, according to 
European Community ambassador to the US, Hugo Paem, "is only a reflection of the 
fact that we don't have the type of government wllich we would feel comfortable 
within the EU" (McKierrnan, 1999). In fact, Olson (1994: 66) predicted that the sup-
pression of Kurdish rights in Turkey would probably prompt the EU to postpone, in-
definitely, or even forever, Turkey's application to join the European Community. 
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The Kurds themselves prefer to live in urbanized Turkey when given some 
kind of autonomy and liberal treatment. They prefer to be able to achieve their eth-
nic and cultural aspirations without having to separate from Turkey. An over-
whelming majority ofKurds do not want a return to violence but when Turkey fails 
to implement the necessary cultural and political changes, then separatism will re-
surface once more. 
In 1994, Prime Minister Ciller seemed willing to recognize the Kurdish pro-
blem as the main issue increasingly threatening the nation's integrity. Ciller appea-
red to define the concept of nationhood very different from Atattirk' s. 
Turkey's Prime Minister conceded that only a political solution would work 
(The Economist, 1995, no. 7908). She seemed to have a more realistic view of things, 
willing to work for "mutual tolerance in a pluralistic framework". "Pluralistic" is a 
popular world in Turkey today, in the face of slogans such as "What a joy to be a 
Turk" still inscribed everywhere in the country. However, other statesmen, such as 
Prime Minister Ecevit, have shown a more rigid stand: "Turkey does not havt: a 
Kurdish issue" (The Economist, 1999, no. 8132). Recently, there has been real change 
when Oujalan, who had been arrested, called on his guerrillas to put down their anns, 
yet Turkish authorities refused to acknowledge his peace gesture. Supporters of in-
creased pluralism and greater cultural autonomy for the 12 million Kurds who live 
inside Turkey are not going to win their case easily. The search for a solution to this 
conflict is sure to be at the forefront of Turkish politics in the 21 st century. 
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Simon Haddad 
KURDI U TURSKOJ: KONTEKST l SADAŠNJI STATUS 
SAŽETAK 
Kurdi koji žive u Turskoj čine gotovo 50% ukupne populacije Kurda u svijetu i oko jedne 
petine stanovništva Turske. Ipak, status te poveće kurdske zajednice u Turskoj predstavlja jedan od 
gorućih problema za turske vlade sve od proglašenja republike 1923 . Od svih zemalja domaćina Kur-
dima nijedna se nije više tmdila eliminirati kurdski identitet. Smatrajući ih prijetnjom j edinstvu i 
integritetu zemlje, sva sredstva za ograničavanje J..-urdskih kulturnih, ekonomskih i političkih aspira-
cija bila su službeno opravdana. U radu se predlaže ispitivanje dviju varijabli povezanih s prisutnošću 
Kurda u Turskoj: J) intenzitet izražavanja kurdskog nacionalizma i 2) reperkusije na kurdska pitanje 
u Turskoj. Na temelju literature konstmirane su tri komponente koje pripadaju slučaju Kurda u Tur-
skoj: osebujan kulturni identitet, politički zahtjevi i društveno-gospodarski razvoj . Usprkos snažnom 
nacionalnom osjećaju Kurdi nisu uspjeli postići autonomiju i nezavisnost u Osmanskom Carstvu. U 
č lanku je prikazano kako je tijekom godina snažan h1rski nacionalizam svojom kemalističkom vizijom 
svjetovnog etatizma sptječavao Kurde da ispune svoje vlastite kulturne i političke zahtjeve. Zapravo 
je službena turska politika tvrdila da Kurda nema i da se kurdski jezik ne govori u Turskoj. Traženje 
·autonomnog stah1sa smatralo se uvredom za integritet države i sankcioniralo se zatvorom. Što se tiče 
gospodarstva, htrska vlada namj erno je uskraćival a sredstva i izvore, namijenjene razvoju, iz kurdskih 
krajeva u jugoistočnoj Anatoliji. Kako bi udovoljile Kurdima, turske vlasti pribjegavaju dvosh-;.1koj 
politici : prva je raspršenje Kurda po cijeloj zemlj i, daleko od glavnoga grada i političkih sred išta, a 
dmga je politika asimi lacije: Kurdi su se pod, j akim djelovanjem Turaka, prisiljeni s nj ima izmiješali. 
Dok su kulhtma traženja Kurda izostavljena iz procesa liberal izacije posljednjih godiha, bilo koj e 
rješenje trajnog sukoba zahtijeva vrijeme i ush1pke obiju strana. Iako su Kurdi pokazali fleks ibilnost i 
spremnost za kompromis, promjena stava Ankare ostaje upitnom. Međutim, tursko javno mnijenje i 
čl anovi vlade traže tlcksib ilniju službenu politiku: Turci više ne smiju smatrati kurdsh1 samosvijest 
smrtnom opasnošću za kontinuitet i integritet Turske i trebaju razlikovati političke zahtjeve za auto-
nomijom od kulhtrnih traženja. Otkako je Evropa razgovarala s Turskom o problemima Kurda, sihla-
cija se donekle poboljšala. Naime, turski zahtjev za pripajanjem Evropskoj uniji zavisi od njezine 
spremnosti da u zemlj i pošh1je ljudska prava i prava manjina. Zbog toga je turska vlada prisiljena naći 
alternativu za represiju i prihvatiti kurdsku realnost. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Kurdi, nacionalizam, Turska, politički zahtjevi, društveno-ekonomski razvoj, 
k11lhtrna prava, represija 
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Симон Хаддад 
КУРДЫ В ТУРЦИИ: КОНТЕКСТ И СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ СТАТУС 
Резюме 
Курды, живущие в Турции, составляют больше половины всех курдов в мире и при­
близительно пятую часть населения самой Турции. Тем не менее, со времени провозглашения 
республики в 1923 г. статус курдов в Турции представляет собой острейшую проблему, сто­
ящую перед всеми турецкими правительствами. Ни одно из государств, в которых живут кур­
ды, не старалосh уничтожить курдский идентитет в большей мере, чем это делала Турция. По­
сколhку курды считались угрозой единству и целостности страны, официально оправдывались 
все средства, ограничивающие курдские культурные, экономические и политические устрем­
ления. В данной работе предлагается исследование двух переменных , связанных с присутст­
висм курдов в Турции: 1) интенсивность исследования курдского национализма и 2) послед­
ствия, оказываемые на курдский вопрос в Турции. На основании литературы воссоздаются три 
компонента, связанных со случаем курдов в Турции: своеобразный культурный идентитет, по­
ЛИТИ'!еские требования и социо-экономическое развитие. Несмотря на сильно выраженное 
национальное чувство, курды не смогли добиться автономии и независимости в Османской 
Империи. В статье покюано, каким образом турецкий национализм, основываясь на кемалис­
тических принципах мирского этатизма, годами препятствовал осуществлению курдских куль­
турных и политических требований. В сущности, официальная турецкая политика утверждала, 
что курды не существуют и что на курдском языке в Турции не говорят. Требование автоном­
ного статуса считалось оnасностыо для целостности страны и санкционнровалос1, тюрьмой. 
Что касается хозяйства, турецкое правительство намеренно ограничивало средства из курдских 
частей юго-восточной Анатолии, предназначенные для рювития. С целью удовлетворения кур­
дов, турецкие власти прибегали к двойной политике: во-первых, к рассеиванию курдов по всей 
стране, в места, отдаленные от столицы и политических центров , и, во-вторых, к политике ас­
симиляции - курды, под сильным влиянием турков, вынуждены персмешиваться с ними. Куль­
турные требования курдов изъяты из процесса либерализации последних лет, причем для ре­
I.!.Iения этого продолжительного конфликта необходимы время и уступки обеих сторон. Хотя 
курды показали гибкость и готовность к компромиссу, изменение позиции Анкары остается 
под знаком вопроса. Однако, турецкое общественное мнение и члены правителr,ства требуют 
более гибкую официальную политику: турки не должны больше считать курдское самосозна­
ние смертельной опасностью для целостности своей страны и должны отличать политические 
требования автономии от культурных требований. После разговоров о проблемах курдов, кото­
рые вел ись между Европой и Турцией, ситуация 'Шстично улучшилась. В частности, осущест­
вление желания Турции присоединиться к Европейскому Союзу зависит от ее готовности 
обеспечить в своей стране соблюдение прав человека и прав национальных меньшинств. По­
этому турецкое правительство вынуждено найти альтернативу репрессии и принять курдскую 
реальность. 
КЛЮЧF:ВЫЕ СЛОВА: курды, национализм, Турция, политические требования, социо-эконо­
мическое развитие, культурные права, репрессия 
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